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New York Appellate Division, Second Dept.
Court Appoints Wife as Receiver to Convey Husband’s Interest in Home.  Husband and wife entered into a stipulation of settlement that was incorporated but not merged into the judgment of divorce.  The agreement provided that wife could occupy the marital residence for three and a half years, unless she remarried in which case the home would be sold.  Three and a half years transpired and the stipulation was modified to provide that the home would be conveyed to the wife.  Shortly after the modification, wife remarried but husband refused to convey the home, arguing that the remarriage provision was still applicable.  Wife sought to be appointed receiver for husband to sign the deed and the Supreme Court, Queens County granted.  The Second Department sustained – “‘A court, by or after judgment, may appoint a receiver of property which is the subject of an action, to carry the judgment into effect or to dispose of the property according to its directions’ (CPLR 5106; see Wagenmann v Wagenmann, 96 AD2d 534, 536). ‘Whether a receiver should be appointed in a particular matter is a determination committed to the court's sound discretion’ (Foley v Gootenberg, 137 AD3d 744, 745).”  The Court stated that the parties modified the remarriage provision by agreeing to convey the home to the wife and that the appointment of the wife as receiver was within the Supreme Court’s discretion.  Caponera v Caponera, 2018 NY Slip Op 07284, Appellate Division, Second Department, October 31, 2018  opinion

 

New York Appellate Division, Second Dept.
Developer Succeeds in Overturning Local Law Authorizing Town’s Retention of Building Permits (Lot Holdback Provision) Notwithstanding Developer’s Failure to Comply with Infrastructure Requirements.  Town Planning Board approved a subdivision for Developer.  Developer was required to post a bond and a letter of credit to secure the construction of infrastructure.  As an additional measure to ensure a construction of infrastructure, a provision in the town code (local law) authorizes the town to withhold issuance of building permits on 10% of the lots until infrastructure is completed.  Town refused to issue permits for several lots and developer sought a declaration that the provision of the town code is ultra vires and null and void.  The Supreme Court, Rockland County ruled in favor of the town but the Second Department reversed.  The Court pitted Town Law (a state statute) vs. the town code (local law) and ruled that “Town Law §277 must be construed to exclude provisions such as those in Town Code § 254-18B which are not contained in § 277”.  The Court stated that §277 authorizes towns to secure performance by financial means and that §277 does not expressly authorize towns to secure performance by withholding permits.  Joy Bldrs., Inc. v Town of Clarkstown, 2018 NY Slip Op 07110, Appellate Division, Second Department, October 24, 2018  opinion